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Abstract
This paper explores the causal relationship between education and fertility. It exam-
ines whether education reduces fertility at the intensive and extensive margins. It also
investigates how education impacts age at first birth. We exploit an exogenous varia-
tion in education induced by an extension of compulsory schooling in Indonesia in 1994.
As this law increased education mainly in regions that were initially lagging behind, a
difference-in-differences variable based on women’s year and region of birth is used to in-
strument education. Our results suggest that additional schooling leads to a decrease in
childlessness and to a delay in first birth, but no effect is observed on achieved or desired
fertility. With regard to the mechanisms, better-educated women are more attractive on
the marriage market, which explains why they are less often childless. While no effect is
found on the labor market, education increases contraceptive use and women’s decision-
making authority.
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1 Introduction
These past decades, fertility has declined in many developing countries. In Indonesia, for
example, fertility rate dropped from 5.7 children in 1960 to 2.4 in 2016. At the same time,
education has significantly increased. A large and well documented literature, using exoge-
nous sources of variation in education, has shown that female education has a direct impact
on fertility. Breierova and Duflo (2004) and Osili and Long (2008), for instance, find that
education leads to a delay in fertility in Indonesia and Nigeria. Similarly, in Kenya, Ferre
(2009) and Ozier (2015) show that education reduces teenage pregnancy. Chicoine (2012),
Dinc¸er, Kaushal, and Grossman (2014), Handa (2000) and Samarakoon and Parinduri (2015)
find that extra schooling reduces overall fertility in Kenya, Turkey, Jamaica and Indonesia,
respectively. This rise in education could partly explain demographic transitions.
The relationship between female education and fertility is intricate as education affects
fertility through many channels (Basu, 2002). Because of data limitations, empirical studies
in developing countries did not investigate all these mechanisms. First, education improves
individuals’ labor market opportunities which increases the opportunity cost of childbearing
(Becker, 1965). While this negative substitution effect could be reinforced by a quantity-
quality trade-off (Becker & Lewis, 1973), it could also be partly offset by an income effect.
Second, extra schooling can increase women’s chances of getting married, which should posi-
tively affect fertility. Moreover, due to assortative mating, additional education increases the
probability of finding a highly educated partner with a greater potential income (Behrman &
Rosenzweig, 2002). Here again, the increase in partner’s education has both an income and
a substitution effect playing contradictory roles. Third, women who study longer may be
more informed about family planning and use contraception more efficiently to reach their
desired fertility (Ainsworth, Beegle, & Nyamete, 1996; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1985, 1989;
Samarakoon & Parinduri, 2015; Thomas, Strauss, & Henriques, 1991).
Whilst fertility is often apprehended by its intensive margin (number of children that
women have), its extensive margin (the fraction of women who are mothers) has been over-
looked by the literature. This is particularly true in developing countries, even though
childlessness is not uncommon. In Indonesia, for instance, around 5% of women aged 40-49
are childless.1 Distinguishing the extensive margin from the intensive one is paramount be-
cause their relationships with education may differ. Baudin, De la Croix, and Gobbi (2015)
show that, in the United States, while fertility decreases with education, the relationship
between childlessness and education is U-shaped.
We exploit an exogenous variation in schooling induced by a law introduced in 1994 in
Indonesia that lengthened compulsory schooling by three years. As this law had a greater
impact in regions where the level of education was initially lower, we use a difference-in-
differences variable defined by both individuals’ year and region of birth to instrument edu-
cation.
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If we find no effect on desired or achieved fertility (intensive margin), the extra induced
schooling leads to a decrease in childlessness (extensive margin) and to a delayed first birth.
Chances of getting married increase with additional education, which partly explains the
negative effect on childlessness. Regarding the other mechanisms, while we find no effect on
the labor market, education increases contraceptive use and women’s decision-making au-
thority on contraception. Our results also confirm the existence of a U-shaped relationship
between childlessness and education.
We contribute to the literature in four ways. Firstly, we provide new evidence on the
causal effects of education on fertility using an original instrument based on a natural exper-
iment that allows for geographical heterogeneity. Doing so, this article complements related
studies which rely on regression discontinuity designs (in developed countries) or on other
instruments (in developing countries). Secondly, we study various dimensions of fertility:
its extensive and intensive margins as well as its timing. Thirdly, we investigate several po-
tential mechanisms: labor market, marriage and contraception. Fourth, like Breierova and
Duflo (2004) and Samarakoon and Parinduri (2015), we study the specific case of Indonesia,
a middle-income country. This study therefore brings new insights compared to studies in
poorer countries such as Kenya (Chicoine, 2012; Ferre, 2009; Ozier, 2015) or Nigeria (Osili
& Long, 2008).
The remaining part of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 1994
compulsory schooling reform and the data. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. Section
4 discusses the results along with robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The 1994 reform and data
2.1 The Nine-Year Universal Basic reform
In 1984, in Indonesia, a law introduced six-year compulsory education for primary school
age children (7-12 years old). Compulsory basic education was then expanded in 1994 to
include junior secondary school (12-15 years old) (Yeom, Acedo, & Utomo, 2002). This
policy, known as Nine-Year Universal Basic Education (NYUBE), targeted at getting basic
education for all children aged 7 to 15 by 2004 (Yeom et al., 2002). Junior secondary school
fees were also made free even though, in reality, parents still have to pay for additional ex-
penditures in schools (school activities, maintenance, etc) (Yeom et al., 2002). This reform
was supported by large Junior Secondary Education programs implemented by the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank between 1996 and 2004. During the whole period,
903 schools and 2,153 classrooms were built.
Exposure to the 1994 reform is therefore determined by individuals’ year of birth. Indi-
viduals aged 15 or more in 1994 (born in 1979 or before) should not, in theory, have been
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impacted by the reform, contrary to those aged less than 15 in 1994. However, in Indonesia,
delayed or early primary school enrollments are not rare2, which could lead to underesti-
mate the effect of the reform. In the baseline regressions, the control (untreated) and treated
groups are reduced to include women aged 16 to 26 and 2 to 12 in 1994, respectively.
2.2 Database
The data used come from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). It is a longitudinal sur-
vey conducted by the Research and Development Corporation (RAND) that began in 1993
and gathered information in four additional rounds: 1997, 2000, 2007 and 2014. Data were
collected in 13 of the 27 provinces of Indonesia and are representative of 83% of the pop-
ulation. IFLS data gather information about educational background, monthly household
expenditures, pregnancy and marital histories, contraceptive use and labor market experi-
ences.
We only use the three most recent waves (2000, 2007 and 2014) because they contain
information on individuals both affected and not affected by the reform. The initial sample
was reduced to keep women over 19 who belong to the old or young cohorts and who provided
information on their pregnancy history. To add a geographical dimension to our analysis,
we only keep women whose Kabupaten (administrative subdivision of province) of birth is
known. Finally, to avoid to artificially increase the number of observations by observing
twice or three times the same women, only the last year of observation was kept. The final
sample includes 4,597 women.3
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. While almost all women have attended
and finished primary school, around 76% of them attended junior secondary school. This
proportion has been increasing over time (82% for the young cohort). Women have been
pregnant on average 1.5 times and report wanting 2.6 children, suggesting that some sample
women, especially in the young cohort, will have additional children in the future. This
could partly explain why 22% of women are childless. The sample is relatively evenly divided
between women who marry up, those who marry down and those who marry a husband with
the same level of education. Women in the young cohort tend to marry up less often than
those in the old cohort which could suggest that the law disproportionally moved girls into
lower secondary school.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - women
Sample All Young Old Mean diff.
cohort cohort Old-young
Age 30.04 26.61 38.95 12.34***
(6.69) (3.19) (4.98) (0.12)
Education: went to junior secondary school 0.76 0.82 0.62 -0.20***
(0.43) (0.39) (0.49) (0.01)
Continued on next page
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Following the previous table
Sample All Young Old Mean diff.
cohort cohort Old-young
Education: finish junior secondary school 0.73 0.79 0.59 -0.20***
(0.44) (0.41) (0.49) (0.01)
Years of education 10.28 10.76 9.05 -1.72***
(4.02) (3.77) (4.38) (0.13)
No. of pregnancies 1.52 1.20 2.33 1.13***
(1.33) (1.00) (1.70) (0.04)
Childlessness 0.22 0.25 0.14 -0.11***
(0.41) (0.43) (0.34) (0.01)
More than one pregnancya 0.54 0.44 0.79 0.35***
(0.50) (0.50) (0.41) (0.02)
No. of desired children 2.55 2.49 2.69 0.19***
(1.02) (0.91) (1.23) (0.04)
Age at first birth 23.29 22.64 24.83 2.19***
(4.24) (3.26) (5.66) (0.15)
Married 0.84 0.83 0.88 0.05***
(0.36) (0.38) (0.32) (0.01)
Spouse’s education 9.85 10.12 9.22 -0.90***
(4.04) (3.82) (4.44) (0.15)
Marry down 0.32 0.33 0.29 -0.04***
(0.47) (0.47) (0.45) (0.02)
Marry same 0.37 0.38 0.35 -0.04**
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.02)
Marry up 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.08***
(0.46) (0.45) (0.48) (0.02)
Ever worked 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.01
(0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.01)
Ever used contraceptive method 0.80 0.82 0.77 -0.04***
(0.40) (0.39) (0.42) (0.01)
Age when first use modern contraceptive method 23.72 22.77 26.02 3.25***
(4.51) (3.34) (5.93) (0.17)
Involved in deciding whether using contraception 0.75 0.77 0.71 -0.05***
(0.43) (0.42) (0.45) (0.02)
Observations 4597 3319 1278 4597
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses except for average differences (column 4)
where standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. a: Among
women with at least one pregnancy.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Sources of exogenous variation in years of education
To cope with endogeneity issues, we exploit an exogenous variation in years of schooling
caused by the extension of compulsory education in Indonesia in 1994. Several articles,
mainly in developed countries, have used compulsory school laws as natural experiments
to identify the causal impact of education on fertility (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2008;
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Braakmann, 2011; Cygan-Rehm & Maeder, 2013; DeCicca & Krashinsky, 2015; Dinc¸er et al.,
2014; Fort, Schneeweis, & Winter-Ebmer, 2011; McCrary & Royer, 2011; Monstad, Propper,
& Salvanes, 2008). A simple graphical analysis shows that the percentage of women attend-
ing junior secondary school increased by 15 percentage points after the reform (Figure 1
(a)). However, when looking at years of education, we do not observe a clear jump but only
a slight increase of less than one year of education (Figure 1 (b)).4 A possible explanation
for this absence of discontinuity might be that many individuals were already meeting the
requirements of the reform before it was implemented: 59% of women in the old cohort
completed junior high school. It prevents us from using a regression discontinuity design.
We therefore consider a second source of variation determining women’s exposure to the
reform: her region of birth. Intuitively, in regions where studying for nine years was the
norm, the reform should not have had any (or a smaller) impact in comparison with regions
where individuals were on average studying less than nine years at the time of the reform.
The intensity of the program is therefore assumed to vary across regions of birth because of
differences in initial level of education. We use the 1993 Indonesian Family Life Survey to
compute, by Kabupaten, the average years of education before the reform. This average is
computed using all the individuals aged 19 or more in order to ensure that most of them left
school or at least have completed secondary school.5 Using regions of birth, we are able to
compute the initial level of education in 13 provinces and 153 Kabupaten.6 We observe a real
heterogeneity across regions (Figure 1.A2, Annex). In regions lagging behind, more effort
was made to achieve junior secondary universal education, making it relevant to differenti-
ate regions by their initial level of education. For instance, the Junior Secondary Education
Projects implemented by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank between 1996
and 2004 were more important in these regions.
As expected, the jump in junior secondary school enrollment following the reform is
greater in regions where the initial levels were low (Figure 2 (a)). In the most educationally
backward regions, enrollment increased by almost 20 percentage points. In comparison, it
increased by only 5 percentage points in the most advanced regions. We now observe a slight
jump in years of schooling for the regions with the lowest initial level of schooling (Figure 2
(b)). In these regions, education increased by almost one year and a half after the reform.
When intermediary cohorts are included, upward trends in educational outcomes quickened
after the reform (Figure 1.A3, Annex).
The identification strategy therefore uses two sources of variation: a temporal and a
geographical variation. This strategy is illustrated in Table 2. If education has increased
overtime, this increase has been lower in regions where the initial level of schooling was
higher (negative difference-in-differences).
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Figure 2: Evolution of schooling by Kabupaten of birth (quintile)
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Table 2: Means of education by cohort and region of birth
Sample: Level of education in
Kabupaten of birth:
Low High Diff
Women Women Women
Aged 2-12 in 94 9.80 12.04 2.24
(0.19) (0.26) (0.32)
Aged 16-26 in 94 7.68 10.90 3.22
(0.22) (0.26) (0.34)
Difference 2.02 1.14 -0.88
(0.19) (0.27) (0.32)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Kabupaten with low level of education in 1993 are
Kabupaten with an average of education below 6 years
in 1993.
3.2 Empirical model
The 1994 reform is used to investigate the causal effect of an increase in education on fertility
behaviors. If a jump in years of schooling was observed when the reform was implemented,
we could rely on a fuzzy regression design (Braakmann, 2011; Cygan-Rehm & Maeder, 2013;
McCrary & Royer, 2011). However, as suggested before, such a jump is only observed in
regions with an initial low level of schooling. We therefore rely on a different method us-
ing the reform as an instrument to education while adding a geographical dimension. This
empirical strategy is similar to the one employed by Bleakley (2010) to study the effects of
malaria-eradication campaigns on labor productivity.
The first-stage equation can be modeled by the following equation:
Eick = β0 + β1(Y oungc ∗ InitialEduck) + β2ac + β3rk + β4Xick + vick (1)
Where Eick represents the number of years of education of woman i in cohort c and born
in Kabupaten k. Y oungc is a dummy variable that indicates whether cohort c was affected
by the educational reform. Y oungc equals one if the woman was aged 2 to 12 in 1994 (ex-
posed) and zero if she was aged 16 to 26 in 1994 (unexposed). InitialEduck represents the
initial level of education before the reform in the Kabupaten k (average years of education
in 1993). ac is a vector of year of birth fixed effects that allows to control for temporal
trends common to all regions (for instance national development programs). rk is a vector
of region of birth fixed effects that controls for region of birth-specific characteristics that do
not change over time (initial regional supply of education, initial development in the region,
etc). Xick is a vector of other characteristics potentially affecting Eick. In all specifications,
this vector includes current age of the woman. Finally, vick is the error term. The coefficient
β1 represents the impact of being affected by the reform and being born in regions where the
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initial level of education increased by one year. The interaction term Y oungc ∗ InitialEduck
can be interpreted as a (continuous) measure of the intensity of the reform. We expect β1
to be negative: the higher the initial level of education in the region of birth, the lower the
impact of the reform.
In the second stage, we estimate the impact of the increases in education induced by the
reform on fertility behaviors:
Yick = α0 + α1Êick + α2ac + α3rk + α4Xick + uick (2)
Yick represents different fertility outcomes for woman i in cohort c born in Kabupaten k.
Other notations have already been defined. The excluded instrument is the interaction vari-
able (Y oungc ∗ InitialEduck). α1 measures the effect of increases in education due to the
regional impact of the reform on fertility behaviors.
Several assumptions need to be made for this empirical strategy to be valid. First, with
regard to the first-stage equation (equation (1)), we assume that, in the absence of the re-
form, trends in educational outcomes would have been the same in both regions (common
trends assumption). This key assumption would be violated if regions where the level of ed-
ucation was low were already catching up before the reform. If so, even in the absence of the
reform, education would have increased more rapidly in “treated” regions and the effect of
the reform would be overestimated. Placebo tests are implemented to test for the existence
of differences in trends before the reform by comparing several untreated cohorts (Table
1.B1, Annex).7 The results suggest that our estimates are not driven by systematic differ-
ences between regions. Moreover, geographical differences are believed to capture something
more than a catch-up phenomenon as large programs of school and classroom construction
were implemented in regions lagging behind by the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank. We also assume that no time varying and region-specific omitted variables are corre-
lated with the interaction variable. This assumption is violated if other regional programs
impacting education were implemented at the same time as the reform (health policies for
instance). In this case, the coefficient in equation (1) could capture the effect of these other
programs (upward bias). Even though it is not possible to include Kabupaten-specific trends,
as a robustness check, we include province-specific trends which capture the effects of other
programs implemented at the provincial level.
Concerning the second stage equation (equation (2)), we assume that, in the absence
of the reform, similar trends in fertility would have been observed. This assumption is
violated if regions lagging behind had a higher initial level of fertility and therefore could
have experienced a faster decrease in fertility even in the absence of the program. Placebo
tests show that there are no differential trends in fertility between cohorts that were not
exposed to the reform (Table 1.B2, Annex).
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4 Results
4.1 First-stage regression
The first-stage regressions are reported in Table 3. F-statistics are above 10 for all estimates.
As expected, the reform had a greater impact in regions where education was initially low.8
These results suggest that the reform could have changed the social norms concerning school-
ing in regions that were initially lagging behind. It is also possible that, in these regions,
the law was more strongly enforced or more efforts were made from a supply point of view
(construction of schools, increased spending on education, etc). These results suggest that
the reform helped the regions that were lagging behind to catch up.9
Table 3: First-stage estimates
Estimator: IV - First stage
Dep. Var (First stage): Years of education
Dep. Var (Second stage) No. of Childlessness More than one No. of desired Age at
pregnancies pregnancya children first birth
Young cohort*level of educ -0.346*** -0.346*** -0.303*** -0.329*** -0.286***
in birth Kabu in 93 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)
Observations 4597 4597 3598 3838 3461
R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Mean outcome 10.28 10.28 9.83 9.98 9.86
No. of clusters 150 150 150 150 150
First stage stat
F-stat 21.182 21.182 16.662 20.052 15.445
P-value associated with F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust clustered (on birth region) standard errors in parentheses: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. a: sample
is restricted to women who have been pregnant at least one.
Following Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), we can distinguish four behaviors depend-
ing on how women would adapt their schooling decisions when compelled by the compulsory
education reform. Some of them, the never-takers, would never attend junior secondary
school even if the reform is implemented. Others, the always-takers, would attend junior
secondary school even in the absence of the reform. A third group, the compliers, would at-
tend junior secondary school only if compelled by the reform. Finally, the last group includes
those defying systematically the law: they would attend school in the absence of the reform
and would not if compelled by the law. Assuming the absence of defiers, we can estimate the
proportion of compliers, never-takers and always-takers in the population (Table 4). Overall,
14% of the women decided to attend junior secondary school because they were compelled by
the 1994 reform, a significant proportion compared to similar studies (Acemoglu & Angrist,
2001; Angrist & Krueger, 1991). These overall statistics hide a regional heterogeneity. In
regions lagging behind, fewer women would have enrolled if not compelled by the compulsory
education reform (40%) and 25% of them decided to enroll because of the reform.
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Table 4: Compliers, always takers and never takers
(1) (2) (3)
% always takers % never taker % compliers
Sample: Birth Kabupaten
All 63% 23% 14%
Lowest tercile of educ in 93 40% 35% 25%
Medium tercile of educ in 93 59% 20% 21%
Highest tercile of educ in 93 81% 10% 8%
Notes: Kabupaten belonging to the lowest tercile are Kabupaten with an average of years of
education in 1993 below 4.2. Kabupaten belonging to the medium tercile are Kabupaten with an
average of years of education in 1993 between 4.2 and 5.9. Kabupaten belonging to the highest
tercile are Kabupaten with an average of years of education in 1993 above 5.9.
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4.2 Fertility, childlessness and age at first birth
Table 5 reports the results for fertility outcomes. For each outcome, the first column reports
the results from a simple OLS regression while the second column presents the results from
the IV estimates. In line with Osili and Long (2008), the increase in education induced by the
reform has neither a significant effect on achieved and desired fertility nor on the probability
of having more than one pregnancy. However, we observe an impact on the probability of
being childless (no pregnancy). An additional year of education reduces the probability of
being childless by around 5.4 percentage points. Once instrumented, the effect of education
on childlessness changes from being positive to being negative. This could be due to the
omission of an unobserved variable affecting both schooling and the probability of being
childlessness positively.10 For instance, education improves women’s labor opportunities
and, independently of their education, women with greater employment prospects prioritize
their careers over getting pregnant. Better-educated women may also be more informed
about contraceptive methods and therefore have more control over their reproductive life.
We also observe a significant effect on age at first birth. An additional year of education
caused by the reform is associated with a delay in their first birth by more than one year.
This result is consistent with Dinc¸er et al. (2014); Ferre (2009); Osili and Long (2008) and
Ozier (2015). OLS estimates give underestimated coefficients. One potential reason for this
negative bias could be the omission of household wealth. In Indonesia, where bride price is
common (Ashraf, Bau, Nunn, & Voena, 2016), richer men may be able to afford the cost
of marriage at a younger age. If they marry women that are themselves more educated, it
could explain a potential negative bias.
4.3 Mechanisms
Turning to the mechanisms, an additional year of education increases the likelihood of being
married by 6 percentage points (Table 7). Women who get more educated are more attrac-
tive on the marriage market, which could explain why they are less often childless. When we
consider only married women, the effect on childlessness disappears (Table 1.C1, Annex). As
women get more educated, their spouses’ profile also changes: they are more likely to marry
men who are themselves more educated.11 However, they are not more likely to marry up
probably because they are themselves more educated. We find no evidence suggesting that
education increases women’s labor market participation.
Turning to contraception (Table 6), extra induced schooling increases women’s likelihood
of using contraception: one additional year of education is associated with an increase in
contraceptive use by 6.5 percentage points (significant at 10% only). This finding is in line
with similar studies in Turkey (Dinc¸er et al., 2014), Sierra Leone (Mocan & Cannonier,
2012) and Indonesia (Samarakoon & Parinduri, 2015). Education also improves women’s
decision-making authority on contraception: women that have been in school one more year
are more likely to be involved in decisions about contraception by 4.8 percentage points.
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Table 6: Impacts on contraceptive use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator: OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. Var: Ever used Age when first use Involved in deciding
contraceptive method modern contraceptive whether using
methods contraceptive
Years of education -0.007*** 0.065* 0.254*** 0.398 -0.002 0.048*
(0.002) (0.035) (0.026) (0.348) (0.003) (0.029)
Observations 3934 3934 2944 2944 3376 3376
Mean outcome 0.80 0.80 23.72 23.72 0.75 0.75
No. of clusters 150 150 150 150 150 150
Birth Kabupaten FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for current age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage stat
F-stat 19.473 15.636 21.187
P-value associated with F-stat 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust clustered (on birth region) standard errors in parentheses: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Only women for which we know the educational level in the Kabupaten of birth.
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4.4 Non linear relationship between childlessness and education
In a recent paper, Baudin et al. (2015) show that the relationship between education and
childlessness is not monotonic. Below a certain education threshold, childlessness decreases
with education while above it increases. This U-shaped relationship is explained by the
reasons for childlessness. Beyond natural sterility, childlessness may be driven by poverty
with the poorest women suffering from diseases, pregnancy-related infections, malnutrition
or high mortality rates preventing them from having children. Education should relax this
poverty constraint and negatively impact childlessness. The second reason for voluntary
childlessness lies in a high opportunity cost of child-rearing. As education increases, labor
market opportunities and potential earnings rise, as well as the opportunity cost of raising
children. Therefore, when education increases, poverty-driven decreases to a minimum and
then opportunity-driven childlessness increases. Because the 1994 law expanded education
at a relatively level (lower secondary education), the decrease in poverty-driven childlessness
may have prevailed on the opportunity-driven one. This assumption is confirmed by the
results reported in Table 8. The first column shows the existence of an education threshold
below which education and childlessness are negatively correlated. The three other columns
confirm that our instrument is only valid for lower levels of education.
Table 8: U-shaped relation between education and childlessness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator: OLS IV IV IV
Dep. Var: Childlessness
Sample:Years of education All Less than 7 7-11 More than 11
Years of education -0.051*** -0.084* -1.668 0.180
(0.006) (0.045) (16.678) (0.270)
Years of education2 0.004***
(0.000)
Observations 4597 1103 1013 2481
Mean outcome 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.30
No. of clusters 150 137 140 149
Birth Kabupaten FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for current age Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage stat
F-stat 10.901 0.009 0.892
P-value associated with F-stat 0.001 0.923 0.346
Notes: Robust clustered (on birth region) standard errors in parentheses: * p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01. a: sample is restricted to women who have been pregnant at least one.
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4.5 Robustness checks
When we use the last year of observation for each woman, we compare women aged 22-32
(young cohort) to women between 36-46 (old cohort). This could potentially explain differ-
ences in fertility outcomes. To observe both cohorts at the same age, we gather information
from the 2000 and 2014 surveys for the old and young cohorts, respectively. All women are
now observed when they were aged 22-32. The sample is reduced and first-stage F statistics
fall under 10 for fertility at the intensive margin (Table 1.C2, Annex). Previous findings with
regard to childlessness and age at first birth are not altered even though, probably because
of smaller size of the sample, the coefficients are less significant.
We try other measures of fertility - number of live births, number of miscarriages and
stillbirths - and the results confirm that the extra induced education had no effect on com-
pleted fertility (Table 1.C3, Annex). Province-specific linear trends are included in order to
control for time-varying unobserved characteristics at the provincial level and the positive
effect on age at first birth is confirmed (Table 1.C4, Annex).12
When intermediary cohorts are added, the results, available on demand, confirm that ed-
ucation reduces childlessness and increases age at first birth. Similarly, excluding individuals
who start school before the official age does not change the results.13 We also add controls
for household wealth (measured when the woman was a child) and for mother’s education
(Table 1.C5, Annex).14 The sample and the significance of the instrument are considerably
reduced, which could explain why no effect is found on the timing of first birth (lack of
power). The other results remain unchanged.
Using regions of birth may not be appropriate if households have migrated and were
educated in other regions. However, regions of birth and of education are highly correlated
with 93% of women who were, at age 12, still living in their Kabupaten of birth. When the
sample is restricted to women who were still living in their Kabupaten of birth at age 12,
the main results are not altered (Table 1.C6, Annex).
5 Concluding remarks
Compulsory education laws have been used as instrument for education in developed coun-
tries. Yet little evidence on their efficiency has been provided, especially in developing
countries. In this article, we focus on a compulsory education law implemented in 1994 in
Indonesia. Although this reform on average increased educational attainment - with 14% of
women who decided to attend junior secondary school - , such an analysis hides a geograph-
ical dispersion. As a matter of fact, the compulsory education law had a greater impact in
regions that were initially lagging behind. These results emphasize that while such policies
can help to reach the Universal Primary Education goal, their effects should not be taken as
granted. A particular attention is therefore needed before using them as instruments. In this
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paper, we do not explore the mechanisms through which such reforms are effective. In the
future, it would be interesting to distinguish regions where more investments were made (con-
structions of schools, etc) or to distinguish regions where the law was more strongly enforced.
Among the significant results, there is no evidence that the extra induced education re-
duces fertility at the intensive margin but it did impact age at first birth and fertility at the
extensive margin. One additional year of education increases age at first birth by more than
one year and reduces women’s probability of being childless by 5 percentage points. This last
result may first appear counterintuitive. It is nevertheless in line with the recent literature
(Baudin et al., 2015) showing that the relationship between education and childlessness is
U-shaped. Indonesian better-educated women appear to be more attractive on the marriage
market, which also partly explains why they remain childless less often.
With regard to other potential mechanisms, there is no evidence that education improves
women’s labor market participation. In this paper, we do not investigate whether educa-
tion affects other dimensions of the labor market such as income, work hours, quality of
jobs. Exploring these issues requires collecting this information before women start having
children. Future research could perhaps investigate this question. Our findings also suggest
that education slightly increases contraceptive use and women’s decision-making authority
on contraception. One more year of schooling increases women’s likelihood of using contra-
ception by almost 7 percentage points and the likelihood that women have decision-making
authority by 4 percentage points.
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Notes
12012 Demographic and Health Survey
241% of sample women started primary school when they were only 6 and 4% started when they were
already 8.
394% are observed in 2014.
4When cohorts aged 13 to 15 in 1994 are included, it becomes even more obvious that there was no
discontinuity following the reform (Figure 1.A1, Annex).
5We chose not to use children’s education in 1993 because of a lack of data even though the two measures
are highly correlated (0.65). The consistency of the indicator we compute is confirmed when comparing it
with average years of schooling and secondary school enrollment rates available in the 1994 Demographic
Health Survey (high correlations of 0.90-0.91).
6The initial level of education by Kabupaten was computed by averaging schooling on 111 individuals in
each Kabupaten on average. Indonesia counts 401 Kabupaten.
7We also compare trends in regions with the lowest level of education in 1993 (first quintile) with the ones
in the highest (fifth quintile). Results, available on demand, show that, even though enrollment rates were
increasing at a faster rate in the regions lagging behind, the difference is not statistically significant.
8The positive effect of belonging to the young cohort is shown by the positive impact of dummies associated
with years of birth 1982-1994 (Figure 1.B2, Annex). When year of birth fixed effects are replaced by a dummy
indicating if the woman belongs to the young cohort, this variable is found positive and significant: on average,
it increases years of schooling by 3.
9These effects do not vary from one cohort to another (Figure 1.B2, Annex).
10It could also be that the omitted variable has a negative effect on both variables.
11Because women potentially unaffected by the reform (young women born in regions lagging behind) are
likely to marry a husband also unaffected (older and born in the same regions), we also include controls for
the spouse’s year and region of birth.
12The effect on childlessness appears to be not significant but it is close to a significance (p-value of 0.11).
13Results are available on demand.
14We do not add all controls in the same estimates because the sample is significantly reduced.
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Annexes
Complementary graphical analyses
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Figure 1.A1: Evolution of schooling
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Figure 1.A3: Evolution of schooling by Kabupaten of birth (quintile)
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Identifying assumptions
Table 1.B1: Placebo tests
Dep. Var: Attend junior Years of
secondary school schooling
Estimator: OLS/DiD (1) (2) (3) (4)
Young cohort*level of educ -0.006 -0.012 -0.233 -0.266*
in birth Kabu in 93 (0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.14)
Observations 1278 1278 1278 1278
R2 0.351 0.351 0.403 0.404
Mean outcome 0.617 0.617 9.045 9.045
No. of clusters 147 147 147 147
Young cohort (treated group): age in 94 16-19 16-18 16-19 16-18
Old cohort (control group): 20-26 19-26 20-26 19-26
Birth Kabupaten FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for current age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust clustered (on birth region) standard errors in parentheses: * p < .1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01.
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Table 1.B2: Placebo for number of pregnancies
Dep. Var: No. of Childlessness More than one
pregnancies pregnancya
Estimator: OLS/DiD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Young cohort*level of educ -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.00 -0.01
in birth Kabu in 93 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 1283 1283 1283 1283 1109 1109
R2 0.133 0.132 0.179 0.179 0.180 0.180
Mean outcome 0.136 0.136 2.329 2.329 0.785 0.785
No. of clusters 147 147 147 147 147 147
Young cohort (treated group): age in 94 16-19 16-18 16-19 16-18 16-19 16-18
Old cohort (control group): 20-26 19-26 20-26 19-26 20-26 19-26
Birth Kabupaten FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for current age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust clustered (on birth region) standard errors in parentheses: * p < .1, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01. a only women with at least one pregnancy. This table tests for pre-reform region specific
trends in fertility outcomes. In each column we compare two cohorts that were not affected by the
reform and assess whether the difference in fertility between these two cohorts varies according to
the initial level of education of their Kabupaten of birth.
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Second stage - additional results
28
T
ab
le
1.
C
1:
F
er
ti
li
ty
ou
tc
om
es
(o
n
ly
fo
r
m
ar
ri
ed
w
om
en
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
E
st
im
at
or
:
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
D
ep
.
V
ar
:
N
o.
of
C
h
il
d
le
ss
n
es
s
M
or
e
th
an
on
e
N
o.
of
d
es
ir
ed
A
g
e
a
t
p
re
gn
an
ci
es
p
re
gn
an
cy
a
ch
il
d
re
n
fi
rs
t
b
ir
th
Y
ea
rs
of
ed
u
ca
ti
on
-0
.0
32
**
*
-0
.0
98
0.
00
8*
**
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
28
0.
00
4
0
.0
1
0
.3
3
9
*
*
*
1
.3
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
6
5
)
(0
.0
2
3
)
(0
.4
8
7
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
38
76
38
76
38
76
38
76
34
43
34
43
36
75
3
6
7
5
3
3
1
7
3
3
1
7
M
ea
n
ou
tc
om
e
1.
72
1.
72
0.
11
0.
11
0.
54
0.
54
2.
56
2
.5
6
2
3
.3
2
2
3
.3
2
5
N
o.
of
cl
u
st
er
s
15
0
15
0
15
0
15
0
15
0
15
0
15
0
1
5
0
1
5
0
1
5
0
B
ir
th
K
ab
u
p
at
en
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
of
b
ir
th
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
on
tr
ol
fo
r
cu
rr
en
t
ag
e
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
F
ir
st
st
ag
e
st
at
F
-s
ta
t
17
.5
85
17
.5
85
14
.7
59
1
7
.9
2
5
1
3
.7
0
3
P
-v
al
u
e
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
F
-s
ta
t
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
N
o
te
s
:
R
o
b
u
st
cl
u
st
er
ed
(o
n
b
ir
th
re
g
io
n
)
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
:
*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
a
:
sa
m
p
le
is
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
w
o
m
en
w
h
o
h
av
e
b
ee
n
p
re
g
n
a
n
t
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e.
29
T
ab
le
1.
C
2:
W
om
en
ag
ed
22
-3
2
at
th
e
ti
m
e
of
th
e
su
rv
ey
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
E
st
im
at
or
:
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
O
L
S
IV
D
ep
.
V
ar
:
N
o.
of
C
h
il
d
le
ss
n
es
s
M
or
e
th
an
on
e
N
o.
o
f
d
es
ir
ed
A
g
e
a
t
p
re
gn
an
ci
es
p
re
gn
an
cy
a
ch
il
d
re
n
fi
rs
t
b
ir
th
Y
ea
rs
of
ed
u
ca
ti
on
-0
.0
59
**
*
0.
12
2
0.
02
6*
**
-0
.1
73
*
-0
.0
15
**
*
-0
.0
53
0.
00
8
0
.1
7
7
0
.2
6
4
*
*
*
1
.0
2
4
*
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.1
46
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
89
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.1
3
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
(0
.5
8
8
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
37
75
37
75
37
75
37
75
28
33
28
33
31
17
3
1
1
7
2
7
8
3
2
7
8
3
M
ea
n
ou
tc
om
e
1.
20
1.
20
0.
25
0.
25
0.
44
0.
44
2.
47
2
.4
7
2
2
.6
4
2
2
.6
4
N
o.
of
cl
u
st
er
s
15
1
15
1
15
1
15
1
15
0
15
0
15
1
1
5
1
1
5
0
1
5
0
B
ir
th
K
ab
u
p
at
en
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
of
b
ir
th
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
on
tr
ol
fo
r
cu
rr
en
t
ag
e
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
F
ir
st
st
ag
e
st
at
F
-s
ta
t
3.
79
2
21
.1
82
3.
16
1
5
.0
8
8
1
5
.4
4
5
P
-v
al
u
e
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
F
-s
ta
t
0.
05
3
0.
00
0
0.
07
7
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
0
0
N
o
te
s
:
R
o
b
u
st
cl
u
st
er
ed
(o
n
b
ir
th
re
g
io
n
)
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
:
*
p
<
.1
,
*
*
p
<
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
.
a
:
sa
m
p
le
is
re
st
ri
ct
ed
to
w
o
m
en
w
h
o
h
av
e
b
ee
n
p
re
g
n
a
n
t
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e.
S
u
rv
ey
s
u
se
d
a
re
th
e
2
0
0
0
a
n
d
th
e
2
0
1
4
w
av
es
fo
r
th
e
o
ld
a
n
d
y
o
u
n
g
co
h
o
rt
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
30
Table 1.C3: Other measures of fertility outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator: OLS IV OLS IV
Dep. Var: No. of live births No. of miscarriages
and stillbirths
Years of education -0.047*** 0.009 0.001 -0.022
(0.005) (0.066) (0.003) (0.058)
Observations 4597 4597 4597 4597
R2 0.26 0.23 0.09 0.07
Mean outcome 1.30 1.30 0.22 0.22
No. of clusters 150 150 150 150
Birth Kabupaten FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control for current age Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage stat
F-stat 21.182 21.182
P-value associated with F-stat 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust clustered (on birth region) standard errors in parentheses: * p < .1, **
p < .05, *** p < .01.
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